Living in an apartment-or house-sharing community may offer numerous advantages. Unfortunately, under certain circumstances this easy, adventurous, harmonious life in such a communal arrangement may turn into a Hobbesian "war of everyone against everyone." Applying some well-known instruments from the economic toolbox, this paper demonstrates why flat sharers' individually rational behavior may lead to collectively undesirable outcomes. It also offers some practical remedies. Tragically, even if housemates realize that they are on the road to ruin, without concerted action, which poses a collective good problem, their livable commune gradually turns into an inhospitable environment.
Exposition
At the beginning of their higher educational careers, most first-year students from different socio-economic backgrounds are forced to look for an affordable dwelling place. There are several types of accommodation to choose from. The simplest and safest option is indeed the status quo. That is, young adults decide to stay at home and continue to live with their parents. Alternatively, students searching for a livable accommodation can rent a small but agreeable apartment of their own. Those who are fortunate enough to have wealthy parents do not have to worry about paying electricity, gas, water, and other dwelling costs. Another possible way to leave the parental home and become more or less independent is to move to a residence hall. Many colleges and universities offer a limited number of subsidized rooms in their dormitories, especially to provide affordable the Commune de Paris. However, the Commune of Paris does not denote a type of housing arrangement but refers to two insurrectionary Parisian municipal governments: the first between 1789 and 1795, during the French Revolution, and the second from 18 March to 28 May 1871, at the end of the Franco-Prussian War. The meaning of 'commune' may be further explored in a dictionary. Skimming through the sixth edition of the Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, for example, one encounters the following entry: a commune is "a group of people, not all of one family, living together and sharing property and responsibilities." This broad definition, however, may apply to different ways of cohabitation, ranging from stone-age cave dwellers and primitive tribes, beyond communal experiments by the Mormon Church, the Hutteries, and the Shakers in 19th century America, to the hippie communes of the 1960s and 1970s. There obviously is the danger of lumping the apartment-or house-sharing communities of our days in one category with these and other communal projects.
Being aware of this potential danger, the term 'commune' is defined here as a community of two or more unrelated adults sharing an apartment or house, which is owned by a landlord, who leases his property on the basis of some kind of contractual arrangement for a stipulated rent. It is further assumed that each member of such a commune has a room of his/her own, and shares some essential facilities like the living room, kitchen, bathroom, or toilet with his/her fellow housemates. Since we consider unrelated adults, family ties, which can be expected to have a positive effect on the evolution of cooperation within a group (e.g., due to love and affection), are removed from the drama at hand. It is, however, more difficult to control factors that may come into play when the characters define themselves as members of religious, ecological, revolutionary, anarchic, spiritual or other commune types. 1 As it is the case with emotional ties within a family, social ties (friendships, love affairs) or personal beliefs (ideology, religion) may promote or hamper cooperation among unrelated individuals. A flat mate, for example, could refuse to do the chores with reference to the Marxian concept of "alienated labor." 2 To be sure, the influence of love, affection, and other (meta-)physical factors on housemates' individual decision-making behavior would deserve a careful investigation. However, regardless of their intended purposes, housemates must somehow manage the everyday organization of communal life. Or, as one of the characters in Brecht's famous 1928 Threepenny Opera at the end of act two put it: "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral" (food comes first, then morals). In his extensive survey of the "communal explosion" in the United States in the period between and 1975 , Miller (1999 quotes the "communal veteran" Peter Coyote who ". . .spoke for legions when he declared: 'Who will empty the garbage, clean the toilets, and do the dishes are mundane but vital questions. . . .If I prefer washing my face in a clean sink and someone else does not, it is a difficult issue to resolve from an ideological position" ' (p. 210) .
In what follows we will observe what can be expected when homines economici, that is, rational and self-interested expected-utility maximizers, live together in a commune. These individuals are assumed to be self-interested in the sense of only being interested in their personal well-being. It is certainly clear that flat mates in real-world settings often do not behave in a purely selfish and fully rational manner, but depart from the "100% self-interest, 100% rationality, 100% self control" assumption (Rabin, 2002, p. 658) . Real housemates may be altruistic, myopic, honest, or naive, ". . .they may have imperfect memories, they may discount the future 'excessively,' they make erroneous calculations and be influenced by how questions are framed, and their perceptions may be distorted by drugs, anesthesia, or Ulysses' sirens" (Becker, 1996, p. 22) . In fact, field researchers sometimes report to have met "self-seeking" individuals; see Abrams and McCulloch (1976, Chapter 4) on this kind of self-seeking behavior. Nevertheless, the quotations from empirical fieldwork in the introduction indicate that the homo economicus assumption seems to be a powerful analytic tool to explain real housemates' behavior in everyday-life situations (e.g., household chores, individual consumption of music). Moreover, working with worst-case scenarios, that is, thinking "through possible negative outcomes" and "imagining what could go wrong," can be a preventive mental simulation for current and future flat sharers; see, for example, Norem and Chang (2002) on "defensive pessimism" and "prefactual thinking."
Empirical relevance
Readers who never have lived in an apartment-or house-sharing community may be inclined to classify this essay as a fun paper, solely written to satisfy the author's need for coming to terms with the past. However, probably former and present flat sharers, who have become frustrated and disenchanted as well, do not see the fun in a 'horror' commune; they may also have experienced some of the serious collective action problems analyzed below. Others could raise the objection that the flat-/house-sharing phenomenon is empirically irrelevant, as it makes up only a miniscule fraction of total accommodation in the United States, Great Britain, or other countries. In this regard Ahrentzen (2003, p. 564) observes: "Shared housing, not being a common or normative housing arrangement in the United States except among certain population groups (e.g., college students), is often looked upon by the press, researchers, and policymakers as an inappropriate or unacceptable housing condition."
Based on a sample of 61,050 housing units that were interviewed in 2003, the U.S. Census Bureau (2004) estimated that about 5.6 million occupied units fall into the category "two-to eightperson households, none related to each other." In other words, 5.4% of total occupied units in the United States are estimated to be occupied by two-to-eight household members which ". . .may be co-owners, co-renters, lodgers, partners, employees, or foster children" (p. A-19). Indeed, it should be noted that " [t] he books make no distinction between housemates and unmarried partners, because we do not want the interviewers to probe into private relationships" (p. A-19). According to the English House Condition Survey (Office of the Deputy Prime Minister, 2003, pp. 32-33) , in 2001 approximately 2.6 million people, comprising 1.3 million households, lived in so-called "houses in multiple occupation." That is 6.3% of all households. "[A]lthough there is no common standard definition of what should be included under this term," this category includes shared houses or flats (293,000 households/965,000 people); households with lodgers (91,000/272,000); self-contained converted flats (579,000/974,000); bedsit dwellings "where occupants share one or more key amenities (kitchen, bathroom or WC) with other households" (363,000/418,000). In short, "[e]xcluding properties converted into self-contained units, 1.7 million people share amenities in their homes with unrelated others in bedsit accommodation, lodgings and shared houses/flats" (p. 28; sample size: 17,500 interviews).
According to the official statistics provided by the German Federal Statistical Office (2004), in 2002 approximately 22.7 million out of the 35.9 million households were two-and-more-person households. Furthermore, it is estimated that in 76% of all German households there are no children under 18 years. Unfortunately, these figures are useless for commune researchers as the governmental statisticians do not differentiate between household members' family status. However, to get an impression of the German communal scene, one can turn to the results of a representative survey among students attending German higher education institutions conducted by Isserstedt et al. (2004, Chapter 11) . It turned out that in 2003 in Germany 22.1% of the 21,424 respondents lived in a flat-sharing community, 23.1% in a single-person household, 21.6% with their parents, 20.1% in a two-person household with their partner, 11.6% in a student hall, and 1.6% lived as subtenants in a single-room dwelling (sample size: 51,556; respondent rate: 41.6%).
In summary, the aggregated data does not suggest what kind of sharers, amenities, and property rights structures are situated in the respective multi-person households, and how commune members organize their daily life. Moreover, as we have seen, the statisticians' definition of the household type 'commune' affects the estimates. Thus, the statistical data presented above does not mirror the exact proportion of flat-/house-sharing communities in total housing in the United States, Great Britain, and Germany. However, the data indicates two points. First, shared-living arrangements represent only a relatively small segment of the considered nation's private rental housing market. Second, sample data shows that, in absolute terms, a considerable number of unrelated individuals in these countries currently lives in shared households. From there, it seems worthwhile to illuminate potential problems with which these residents must cope.
The shady sides of communal life
In an apartment-or house-sharing community as defined in Section 2, a mixture of different types of goods and their respective property rights may appear. The spectrum ranges from private property (dwellers' private rooms and books, for example) to common property including collectively used rooms and infrastructure like, for instance, a washing machine, microwave, or deep freezer. It is important to note that communes and their respective systems of property rights may change over time. If only common property is at stake we can speak of a 'hard core' commune, ". . .as in the communes where everything-right down to clothing and sometimes even toothbrushes-was shared" (Miller, 1999, p. 193 ). As mentioned above, the communes considered here are leased, that is, the shared apartment or house remains in the ownership of a landlord. And it still should be kept in mind that the terms commune and communist here simply are synonyms for other value-free notions like apartment-/house-sharing community or flat/house share, and their respective dwellers. In the following sections we will concentrate on potential conflicts of interest and utilization that may arise when individuals live together in such a commune.
Negative externalities: silence as a scarce resource
At first glance, communal life seems to be trouble-free. Just as actresses and actors in a daily soap opera, communists begin a joint venture day after day with breakfast, chats, lunch, watching television, and other group "rituals" (Heath, 2004, pp. 170-172) . If from time to time one needs rest or is annoyed with his/her flat mates, then each dweller is free to shut the door and retreat into the privacy of one's own space. Emotional conflicts are nothing out of the ordinary in interpersonal relationships. However, situations may arise in which a communist may lose his/her temper. Suppose, for example, that a resident is awoke every night because his flat mate is noisy by singing, bawling, etc. (Gurney, 2000) . Or, imagine a young lady who rides her bicycle to her mathematics course three times a week but, beforehand, she must get her four housemates' bicycles out of the way each time. In economic terms, disturbance and messiness in a collectively used living area can be interpreted as negative externalities. That is, a single dweller's activities may have a negative effect on his fellow dwellers' individual welfare, diminish their quality of living. Noise pollution or 'incorrect' parking of a bicycle are quite rational from the viewpoint of a single polluter or cyclist but potentially impose "social cost" (Coase, 1960) on the communal environment. 3 In the setting at hand it is likely sufficient to ask the polluter-flat mate(s) to refrain from making noise or ruthless bicycle parking. Moreover, the communists may negotiate about noiseless periods, levels of noise pollution, or parking rules in order to remedy such negative external effects. Indeed, one should bear in mind that there may be serious trade-offs between dwellers' objectives. For example, well-meant grooming and vacuum-cleaning in the middle of the night possibly interfere with other communists' sleep. To a certain degree, each dweller will likely tolerate that his/her fellow lodgers have different habits, lifestyles, hobbies, and daily routines. The financial advantages of shared housing may compensate for a great deal of annoyance. Nevertheless, in extreme cases, when even courteous pleas, rules of the house, and/or ear plugs do not allow for the satisfaction of elementary needs like sleeping and reading, relocation may be the only way out of an unpleasant environment.
Invisible hands? House cleaning and free-riding
Visitors of a (student) flat-sharing community in its pathological end-stage may look at a mountain of dirty dishes in the sink and piles of rubbish in the corridor, stairway, attic, and basement. Field researchers may find empty beer bottles, packages of pizza and potato chips, or a bunch of junk not in use. In the bathroom and lavatory the visitors can hardly ignore mould and malodor. Once in a while a little mouse, rat, or other various pests scamper around. 4 The entrance area and the backyard are infested with interesting flora, cigarette butts, and bottle caps. An 'impressed' observer may wonder why adults pollute their closest environment in such a way. Actually, the mess ought to catch each community member's eye. Every communist could recognize that he/she currently is in the act of "fouling our own nest" (Hardin, 1968 (Hardin, , p. 1245 . Another interesting phenomenon is the 'socialization' of rubbish. Bits and pieces that have lost value for a single resident are transferred outside his range of vision; for instance, into the cellar, attic, backyard, or other collectively used storage spaces. Interestingly, in comparison to the collectively used areas the flat sharers' private rooms are, more or less, neat and clean.
In light of the homo economicus model, this ambiguous outcome is by far less impressing and coincides with economists' insights in the area of environmental pollution. As briefly outlined in the introduction, in a flat share populated with rational, self-interested individuals housekeeping in the jointly used areas can be interpreted as a (non-existing) collective good. If house and backyard are neat as a pin, then (1) no flat sharer can be excluded from enjoying the clean environment, and (2) there is no rivalry in the 'consumption' of environmental cleanliness. Or, in the words of Samuelson (1954, p. 387) , ". . .each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction from any other individual's consumption of that good." Even if a pleasant ambience is in every sharer's personal interest, under these circumstances being a cleaner is irrational from the individual viewpoint.
To illustrate this point, let us take a glance at the commune of Karl, who is a rational egoist. 5 From his individual viewpoint the situation is as follows: Karl does not know whether or not his housemates engage in clean-up efforts. However, he does know that he would be the 'sucker' when he contributes to house cleaning while his fellow lodgers defect. As depicted in the payoff matrix below (Fig. 1) , the sucker's payoff in this game is S (=cooperate, others defect). Therefore, in Karl's view it is a tempting strategy to rely on somebody who someday and somehow does the housework, whereas Karl the defector himself can feel good in a clean house without making a contribution to house cleaning; in this case Karl receives the payoff T (=defect, others cooperate). Needless to say, Karl prefers T over S. And he also knows that in the event of mutual cooperation he will receive R (=reward in the form of a clean commune) which would make him better off than P, the payoff in the case of mutual defection (=punishment in terms of living in a dump).
For an outside observer of this game it is very easy to predict what will happen when Karl's housemates, who also have the choice between cooperation and defection and make their choices simultaneously with Karl, are purely rational egoists as well. As every communist anticipates that his fellow dwellers will try to free ride and shift the chore onto others, no one does the housework and the house slowly but surely decays-each player has to live with the situation P. Certainly, the community as a whole would be better off if each member contributes his part to domestic work. In this case each communist would receive R. But the housemates' individual ranking of payoffs is T > R > P > S. Stated another way, each communist yields a higher payoff by choosing defection, no matter how the other housemates play: "This means that it is better to defect if you think the other player will cooperate, and it is better to defect if you think the other player will defect" (Axelrod, 1984, p. 9) .
Thus, in this cleaners' dilemma individually rational and selfish behavior leads to a collectively undesirable, unhygienic, and eventually pathogenic outcome-plausibly taken for granted that all flat sharers, who may have gradually different affinities to dirt (ranging from messie to cleanliness maniac), prefer a homelike environment to an inhospitable surrounding. At the same time, one may expect that communists spend more time on cleaning their respective private rooms. The relative tidiness is due to the simple fact that with the 'keys to cleanliness' it is possible to exclude other flat sharers. Each owner decides who may share in the comfy atmosphere, desk, computer, or bed of his private room.
Changing the rules of the communal game as a retarding element
At this point an old theme of political philosophy, the Hobbesian problem of order, comes into play; namely, the simple but vital question ". . .how cooperation can emerge among egoists without central authority" (Axelrod, 1984, p. viii) . Even though the invisible hand mechanism of house cleaning does not work in the communal spaces of a group of selfish individuals, there is no reason for despair for dwellers confronted with the theoretically predicted awkward situation of mutual defection. As the presented one-day social dilemma game in reality is not played once but repeatedly, it makes sense to hold a house meeting after the first round of the game-provided that there is still opportunity of face-to-face communication among the players. One of the communists, who has read the well-meant suggestions in "The Share Housing Survival Guide," could deliver a speech: "Like it or not there are certain tasks which have to be done for a household to continue functioning. The toilet is not self-cleaning, the garbage has to go out eventually and disposable plates are not the answer to the washing-up saga. Floors, bathrooms and lawns also need looking after" (Richardson et al., 2005, p. 53) . Via discussion, housemates possibly may reach consensus over appropriate rules in order to make their commune more livable. For example, communists could collectively devise a 'clean house plan' in which duties and responsibilities in regard to sweeping, mopping, doing the dishes, etc., in the shared living areas are structured and divided among the housemates.
In a flat share with diligent, responsible, and benevolent dwellers this remedy is an ideal solution, which then produces the mutually beneficial outcome R (=mutual cooperation). Indeed, in a commune of do-gooders this type of household management is irrelevant due to the attention to dirt and necessary repairs paid by all. Unfortunately, selfish housemates will not abide by the collectively binding agreement and decay persists. Again, this is not surprising from an economic viewpoint because monitoring dwellers' compliance with the clean-house regulations is a collective good as well. Just as in many natural common-pool settings analyzed by Ostrom and colleagues, three collective action problems are to be solved in this situation: (1) commune cleaning, (2) creating rules for commune cleaning, and (3) monitoring and sanctioning the created rules for commune cleaning (Ostrom, 1998, p. 425) . However, in a small-scale commune (say, five persons) such higher-order collective good problems are likely to be solved by face-to-face communication and social control. After establishing some house rules, anti-social polluters are repeatedly requested by the other group members to abide by the agreement.
When even discussions, house rules, and soft sanctions like 'naming and shaming' fail to work, communists could, as an experiment, agree to privatize their collective refuse disposal service. According to the polluter pays principle, each member is in charge of disposing his/her own waste. In the last instance, polluters and claimants should meet again and discuss the future of their living arrangement. 6 In retrospect, Miller (1999, p. 210) reports: "The little chores of daily life became some of the principal centers of contention in a great many communes-and in fact the proximate cause of the breakup of more than a few." Another possible way to solve the social dilemmas discussed in this section is the option to hire an individual from outside the commune to clean-provided that the communists are (i) willing to pay and (ii) able to pay for a commercial cleaning service. Moreover, it can be expected that the landlord of a flat/house share intervenes when his private property deteriorates. Thus, there is some kind of "coercion" (Olson, 1965) as tenants should abide by the obligations fixed in their legally binding and enforceable contract(s) with the landlord.
Rental contracts-opportunism is in the house
It is a commonplace that human interactions are not always free of conflict. Thus, the quality of interpersonal relationships in a commune may change over time, for example, when financial affairs come into play. Particularly the design of the rental contracts between the landlord and his tenants should be handled with reasonable care. In such contracts the right to use the landlord's property is ". . .leased for a specific period of time in exchange for periodic payments of a stipulated price, the rent" (Furubotn and Richter, 1998, p. 132) . Let us consider for a moment the landlord's perspective. From his standpoint, there is no perfect foresight concerning the tenants' future payment behavior. Furthermore, the landlord does not know at the outset how his renters will deal with the leased property in the future. Thus, the landlord runs the risk that his proprietary depreciates over time due to the apartment sharers' behavior. In the course of this paper we have already seen that it is not implausible that a livable commune under certain circumstances can gradually deteriorate. Or, in the words of Furubotn and Richter (1998) : "As is well known, the tenant or lessee does not have the same incentive as a full owner to use the property with care and show serious concern over its maintenance. Thus, maintenance has to be required in the contract, and monitoring costs arise for the owner. What exists here is a typical moral hazard (or hidden action) problem that is subject of principal-agent theory" (pp. 133-134).
It becomes clear that a rental agreement is in some sense an incomplete contract, because when the contract is signed, "[m]any contingencies are unforeseen (and even unforeseeable)" (Williamson, 1985, p. 178) . But some simple remedies, which have stood the test of time, appear to be appropriate for the prevention and settlement of rental disputes. Without going into judicial details, normally a contractual agreement including an up-front security deposit, a condition report, legal periods of notice, etc., does its job and can be enforced by legal authorities. If a tenant does not fulfill the contractual obligations (e.g., default in payment of rent, destruction of leased property) the landlord can appeal to the courts. In other words, the parties concerned are contracting in the shadow of the law.
In real life, however, tenants, who have signed a legally binding and enforceable rental agreement, may find ways to step out of this shadow. Take, for example, a young lady, who makes false statements about her identity, succeeds in spiriting the rental contract away, or disappears in a cloak-and-dagger operation. In short, there are contingencies that cannot be regulated by legally binding and enforceable contracts of lease. 7 Problems due to the incompleteness of rental contracts are to be expected if we assume tenants, landlords, and landladies to be ". . .self-interest seeking with guile. This includes but is scarcely limited to more blatant forms, such as lying, stealing and cheating" (Williamson, 1985, p. 47) . This behavioral assumption brings the element of surprise into the Tragedy of the Commune. However, rational landlords or landladies, who anticipate different forms of pre-contractual opportunism (e.g., lying) and post-contractual opportunism (e.g., fly-by-night), will carefully examine to whom they rent his/her house or apartment, and insist on an up-front security deposit.
Up to this point we have considered contractual arrangements between the landlord (L) and each of the tenants (T) who live in his apartment or house (contract type L-T). Apart from this traditional 7 Recently, German media reported about the proliferation of so-called 'rent nomads', who rent an apartment, fail to pay the rent, move out, rent another apartment, and so forth. These nomads usually undertake no fly-by-night operations. Quite the contrary, they know that due to the tenants' protection legislation there is a considerable time-lag between notice of termination and eviction by court. Kretzer (2005) provides a legal analysis of "rent nomads, apartment hopping, rent tourism, and accommodation zapping" in Germany, and offers some remedies.
form of rental agreement one can sometimes observe more complicated but interesting contract structures. In Germany, for example, some landlords make their respective private property (house, apartment, interior) only available for an apartment-sharing community under the condition that one of the flat sharers plays the role of the so-called head-tenant (HT). This person signs a contract with the landlord (contract type L-HT). In this contractual arrangement, the landlord must only deal with one potential fly-by-night operator. The head-tenant commits himself to pay the periodical rent payments and to keep the landlord's property in good repair. In other words, the head-tenant is legally responsible for the other housemates' actions (damage of the landlord's property, for example), and it is his job to collect communists' individual rent payments-no easy job within a community of self-interested (or even opportunistic) individuals. As a precaution, in German flat shares usually so-called sublease agreements exist. These are legally binding and enforceable contracts between the head-tenant (HT) and each of his fellow flat mates-viz., his sub-tenants (ST). 8 For the sake of completeness, it should be mentioned that sometimes landlords in Germany (as well as Australia) offer rental contracts for the shared household as a whole. Such a joint rental contract is signed by each member as a so-called co-tenant (CT), who pays his share of the total rent for the shared apartment or house directly to the landlord (contract type L-CT). As all communists are named in such a contract, each of them is liable for their co-tenants actions (e.g., default in payment, breach of contractual obligations). In the normal case, the depicted types of lease contracts, L-HT and L-CT, work. Clearly, these rental agreements are also incomplete contracts. Let us suppose what happens when the landlord and the commune members are locked into arrangements of the type L-HT-ST. As soon as malicious acts come into play, outside observers sometimes can observe a thrilling game in which each player tries to pass the buck in the form of the financial burden to others. Consider, for instance, the case that a sub-tenant has undertaken a fly-by-night operation. In this situation the head-tenant is not willing to pay the alumna's expenses alone and proposes to spread the outstanding rent payments among all remaining sub-tenants. The head-tenant's fellow flat sharers, who are always short on money, refuse to pay for her former 'sisters' escape, and threaten to stealthily flee as well. If the headtenant is unwilling and/or unable to pay as well, in the last resort only one player remains: the landlord, who pays the cost in terms of foregone rental income and reconstruction of damaged property. 9 However, as outlined above, there are some mechanisms that can be integrated by landlords, head-tenants (contract type HT-ST), or co-tenants (contract type L-CT) into the different types of rental agreements to solve the expected problems at the outset. Most notably, an up-front security deposit and careful applicant screening may be effective ex ante safeguards against ex post opportunism such as fly-by-night operations and negligent destruction during the course of the contractual relationship. To be sure, tenants are not the only ones to act opportunistically. Sometimes the landlord is the villain of a communal drama. In the light of their findings, Christie et al. (2002, p. 223) report: "At the worst, there appeared to be some exploitative landlords who took advantage of new students' relative tolerance and ignorance of the market to charge a great deal for very unsatisfactory accommodation." It is often a symptom of a preliminary stage of a looming drama when the landlord himself importunately chooses new flat sharers. The same holds for households with "high and rapid turnover of tenants" where "total strangers," chosen by the landlady, are presented as the new housemates. For details see Heath (2004, p. 170 ) whose "Single Young Adults and Shared Household Living project" focuses on "non-student sharers aged 18-35" in the Southampton area (UK).
The refrigerator game: first come, first self-served
Domestic activity and rental contracts may not be the only sources of contention within an apartment-sharing community. Dwellers may also be confronted with trouble, which can remain latent or tolerable to a certain extent, but, in case of discovery, has serious consequences for all parties concerned. Take, for instance, the depletion of the jointly used refrigerator, larder, or wine cellar. If the worst comes to the worst, these collectively utilized reservoirs are completely plundered-"the early bird catches the worm" is therefore the motto. Remarkably, in the case of beer, pasta, chocolate, and other food often one resource unit is left over in the respective reservoir, maybe out of decency (later more on 'anomalous' behavior). Be that as it may, in contrast to an unguarded natural common-pool resource in the great outdoors, entry to a domestic commons is usually restricted to a limited number of community members. More precisely, a jointly used refrigerator or other common-pool resources can be denoted as club goods with rivalrous consumption. As non-members can easily be excluded from appropriating the club's resources, there-in fact-should be no utilization problems (Buchanan, 1965) . Nevertheless, one does not have to be a professional biologist or anthropologist to realize how selfish communists' 'forage' may turn out to be, even in a small club-commune.
Some basic insights from research on commonly used fisheries, pastures, or forests offer a simple but plausible explanation for phenomena of individually rational but ruthless exploitation. Suppose, for example, a five-person commune in which the club members commonly use one fridge and buy foodstuffs on a joint account. 10 At the beginning of the exploitation game, this common-pool resource is filled with groceries. Each resource unit that is extracted from the limited quantity of food is no longer available to other group members. As this simple fact is common knowledge, every communist is afraid of looking into an empty refrigerator and a distribution fight is likely to emerge: each member expects the others to be gluttons. Thus, rational eaters in this competition for scarce common property food will be swift to take food from the club-pool. By contrast, those who are less swift must face either an empty stomach or are forced to go shopping in order to refill the common resource. To put it with Gordon (1954, p. 135 ) in a seashell, "[t]here appears, then, to be some truth in the conservative dictum that everybody's property is nobody's property. Wealth that is free for all is valued by none because he is foolhardy enough to wait for its proper time of use will only find that is has been taken by another."
However, not only the rapid exploitation of the common-pool resource 'refrigerator' may arise as a problem within a commune. Under these circumstances the housemates also face a serious collective action problem regarding the maintenance of their common food pool. The collective as a whole benefits when someone goes shopping to refill the fridge. Rational egoists, however, can be expected not only to engage in speedy depletion but also in defection regarding the maintenance of the food pool. That is, they will rarely contribute to joint purchase, and attempt to shift shopping efforts on other group members. When all housemates behave according to "the 'frigid' calculus of economics" (Becker, 1976, p. 4) , the refrigerator remains empty, and the species homo economicus communis dies out. In contrast to this worst-case scenario, in real life usually somebody pulls himself/herself together, goes shopping, and fortunately eliminates the life-threatening bottleneck in food. Moreover, the establishment of a system of 'rotational shopping' may provide a constant food supply for the commune. Nevertheless, as in the case of cleaning chores mentioned earlier, there is no guarantee that a housemate, who is responsible for his/her fellow lodgers food supply in a certain period, sticks to the bargain-even though "mutually agreed upon" (Hardin, 1968 (Hardin, , p. 1247 ).
Other common-pool resources
On a walkabout through a commune, field researchers may not only find scarce, finite commonpool resources in the sense ". . . that one person's use subtracts from the quantity of resource units available to others" (Ostrom, 1998, p. 424) . Unpaid bills on the kitchen table, drippy water taps, 'sanctuary' light (i.e., someone has forgotten to turn out the light), heating in the summer, showering for hours, or radio music without listeners are symptoms of a more subtle form of excessive consumption that may remain more or less unnoticed for a long time. Whereas the consequences of depleting the common refrigerator can hardly be ignored by the dwellers ("Oh, the fridge is empty again!"), the collective consumption of electricity, water, or gas is unlimited for the time being. Rather, the gas-, water-, and electricity-meter subtly rotate in the basement. The meter readings arrive via mail not until the end of each accounting period. In extreme cases, the communists plunge themselves into debt due to horrendous bills for utilities. This outcome is not an act of nature beyond control but (wo)man-made: each flat sharer has taken more or less part in boosting joint consumption. 11 Needless to say, outstanding utility bills cannot be observed in shared households in which tenants pay rents, utilities included. But if tenants come into financial difficulties the landlord is the one who suffers from communists' excessive consumption. To avoid this worst case, a landlord can take a simple measure of precaution: commune members have to pay rents, utilities not included, and must agree to self-manage their supply with water, electricity, and heating; that is, they have to sign contracts with the utilities. In this way, the landlord elegantly opts out from the housemates' common-pool resource games. Now communists working with worst-case scenarios will install a system of prudential risk allocation. To protect against housemates, who are unwilling to pay their share of the bills or undertake a fly-by-night operation, each resident has to sign one of the utility contracts.
However, some insights from the introductory chapters of any economics textbook offer a simple but plausible explanation for phenomena of excessive consumption. To illustrate, we return to the five-person flat-sharing community with which we became acquainted in the competitive race for food described above. Under a regime of buying foodstuffs on a joint account it can be expected that each communist's propensity to buy is higher than in the case in which each dweller would buy groceries on his/her own account. Instead of paying for the total food cost (TFC) per calculation accounting period (for instance, per month), a single communist bears 'only' the average food cost (AFC = TFC/5). For example, when buying an additional commodity on his daily shopping tour, dweller X has not to pay the full cost for the additional piece in his basket of goods but, in principle, only one-fifth. "Price is not an issue. I'm shopping on joint account. I'll get the outlaid money back from the collective," is the rational commune shopper's calculus.
One must not be a professional economist to see the consequences of such an incentive scheme. If the decision makers, who presumably have different preferences and disposable incomes, do not coordinate what and how much they buy, then subtly the commune's monthly spending on food is likely to experience an extreme increase. Similar problems may arise in other domestic areas in which the members also consume from a common account. Imagine, for example, a commune that possesses only one phone/internet line for all members. This can lead to excessive, unlimited telephoning/surfing at the community's expense. Of course, forms of excessive consumption in a commune are extreme outgrowths of ignorance, or, better, stupidity because flat sharers are in the same boat and must bear the consequences collectively. It naturally can be assumed that dwellers are adaptive and can control their joint expenditures. That is, in the next consumption round they learn to commit themselves to certain rules. For example, they create a shopping list that prevents hungry communists from finding vast quantities of Swiss cheese, Hungarian salami, and French jam or the like-but no bread and butter.
Privatization and its limitations
Another potential remedy which may counteract the depicted common-pool problems is that the flat sharers agree upon trading for their respective own account. It follows that henceforth the members declare to install five telephones, and to label their private property (milk, yogurt, juice, and the like) with their initials. Indeed, by doing so a community with collective consumer goods transforms into a loosely coupled community of N-single-person households. However, implementing such privatization strategy does not inevitably imply that individual flat mates are better off compared to the status quo ante. Now each cohabitant must sign a contract with the local telephone company, the municipal utility, and so on. The arising transaction costs may reduce an individual's monetary net utility from living in an apartment-sharing community. Moreover, applying the exclusion principle does not automatically prevent fellow lodgers' covert consumption of one's cereals, orange juice, tooth paste, or shower gel-upon being asked, each potential 'thief' will shift the blame on others: "It wasn't me." In other words, monitoring the club's common-pool resources and one's own private property may be a time-consuming task. For example, watchful occupants trying to prevent others from eating their private food must never leave the kitchen. Such is life when you must permanently keep a watchful eye on the refrigerator.
Specifying private property rights and excluding others from sharing your supply, in principle, is possible at once. On the communal level, prospective private property holders may simply buy a permanent marker in the shop around the corner. Take, for example, the refrigerator game discussed in Section 4.5. To solve this problem the residents may decide to divide their communal refrigerator into marked (or even locked) sections. Alternatively, the residents may agree that each communist rents or buys an (lockable) refrigerator of her own. Nevertheless, why are these and other solutions to the problems with common-pool resources apparently not being introduced in each apartment-sharing community?
Perhaps, there are some housemates, who do not care about increasing transaction costs and lost economies of scale but become dissatisfied because their communal project ("each according to his ability, each according to his need") turns into a disdainful partnership of convenience with locked refrigerators, meticulously itemized bills and scores of stuff with strange codes like KM, dcb, or JF. 12 In other words, privatization of communal life potentially contradicts some dwellers' idea of a commune. Of course, this is an ad hoc argument based on preferences that can only be tested on a case-by-case basis; that is, by a careful empirical examination of real-world households. Another plausible explanation why we still can observe common-pool resources in shared households are the dwellers' cost-benefit analyses. Compared to the difficulties raised by establishing effective systems of property rights in the cases of common air or fishing grounds, property rights in a refrigerator are much easier to define and enforce. It could be argued, however, that the commonly used fridge and other common-pool resources (just like the institution of sharing apartments or houses as a whole) survive because the cost of defining and enforcing private property rights that might solve potential conflicts of utilization are still greater than the expected benefits of privatization.
By the way, housemates should reflect about two famous dicta when changing the rules of the communal game. The first is said to have made by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870 Lenin ( -1924 , who was the 'business manager' of a lost large-scale commune called Soviet Union: "Trust is good, control is better," he allegedly said. The second dictum is taken from Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" and has been slightly modified for purposes of illustration: "Freedom in a comm [une] brings ruin to all" (Hardin, 1968 (Hardin, , p. 1244 . It is highly questionable if command and control ("You shall do this, and mustn't do that"), detective-like monitoring ("What are you after?"), and a climate of mutual distrust among members are a good basis for living together in a commune. Insights from economic psychology suggest that under specific conditions excessive external control, a regime of law and order for example, may crowd out individuals' intrinsic motivation (for surveys see Deci et al., 1999; Frey and Jegen, 2001 ). Housemates' exaggerated anxiety for their respective private property, for instance, may send out signals of distrust. In an interview study by Heath (2004) it turned out that practices of access control and "the etiquette of going into each other's bedrooms" are sensitive issues in shared households: "Carole exclaimed in relation to houses with bedroom locks: 'Ooh, scary houses-don't move in there!"' (p. 169).
Games real communists play
Equipped with the homo economicus assumption and some fundamental concepts out of the economic toolbox, the preceding sections have illuminated possible shady sides of living together in a flat share. It has been demonstrated what prospective and current flat sharers can expect from communal life if the worst comes to the worst. The presented outcomes are likely to arise if all characters in this drama act as rational and selfish expected-utility maximizers. Tragically, even if the housemates never heard of scarcity, externalities, free-riding, or other basic concepts of economics, with some common sense reasoning it would have been easy to recognize that their individually rational behavior leads to sub-optimal outcomes for their commune as a whole. Probably, (ex-)flat sharers can give an account of many everyday problems that remained unconsidered here. For instance, car sharing and bike sharing; domestic violence; coalitions among housemates; disputes with neighbors; lending money and valuables; interim tenancy; flirting; the battle of the sexes; the role that pets, children, boyfriends or girlfriends, and their respective 'owners' play in a commune; or housemates' joint leisure activities including surfing holidays (Rider, 1998) .
Against the pessimistic undertone of this paper, it is quite obvious that real communists' interactions in social dilemma situations, like consumption on common account, the refrigerator game, or the cleaners' dilemma, do not inevitably end in a catastrophe. Apparently cooperation does emerge among housemates, otherwise we would be able to study the phenomenon of shared housing only in historical works nowadays. It is tempting to 'explain' cooperation among nonrelatives in communal living arrangements with ad hoc reference to findings from game theory, theories of collective action, or experimental evidence from the laboratory. An armchair commune researcher may presume that housemates in real-world settings often behave in a less than fully rational manner (with reference to, e.g., Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001; Kahneman, 2003) , violate the predictions derived from the narrow self-interest assumption (Ledyard, 1995; Gintis, 2000; Kopelman et al., 2002; Falk et al., 2002) , live in "small groups" in which "selective incentives" (e.g., social recognition, disapproval) are at work (Olson, 1965) , and play infinitely repeated games. 13 But without going into the field (for instance, visiting shared households and interviewing the residents) these ad hoc hypotheses remain mere speculation.
Therefore, it makes sense to continue the search for potential factors that may have ensured communal survival on firmer terrain, and examine the economic constraints that flat sharers' face. According to Isserstedt et al. (2004, p. 219) , in 2003 in Germany the average monthly expenditures for rent (utilities included) amounted to 181 Euros (about US$ 208) for students who found accommodation in a dormitory, 232 Euros ($267) for students living in an apartmentsharing community, and 300 Euros ($345) for students who lived in an apartment of their own. The selected data suggests that flat/house sharing may be an attractive option (i.e., relatively cheap alternative) for house-hunting individuals. Particularly individuals with a relatively low disposable income may be obliged to move in an apartment-sharing community because they cannot afford an apartment or house of their own. 14 Other people may deliberately choose this resident type because the expected individual (non-)monetary net utility from living in a shared household may be greater than the net benefit anticipated from living in other feasible housing arrangements. Residents leading a frugal life may use a commune simply as a cost-sharing arrangement. Singles may join such a community, in order to experience some kind of ersatz family or to increase the probability of finding a new partner. Perhaps, there are many other expected (non-)monetary benefits of living in an apartmentsharing community. However, as has been emphasized above, without careful empirical analysis armchair theorizing with non-monetary costs and benefits is mere speculation.
On the other hand, speculating about potential outcomes of communal games may be a helpful tool for worst-case thinkers. By doing so, game theory offers some advice on how (not) to play communal games. At first glance, it seems to be a promising strategy for real players to act as a "conditional cooperator" (Keser and van Winden, 2000; Ostrom, 2000) or "homo reciprocans" (Gintis, 2000) . Such individuals cooperate so long as their housemates cooperate as well. In a small and stable group, members rapidly learn which cohabitants are trustworthy and fair players. When daily life becomes then unsatisfactory because a critical number of housemates begins to defect, and their non-cooperative behavior appears to be no exception, conditional cooperators reciprocate "defection with defection, leading to a downward spiral of non-cooperation" (Gintis, 2000, p. 316) . As the last clause indicates, for the protection of one's health it is advisable to play TIT FOR TAT ("An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth") not in any circumstances. The decision rule to cooperate in the first round of the game and subsequently reciprocate with the opponent's previous move, may be a successful response-strategy in computer tournaments of the iterated prisoners' dilemma game. Nevertheless, using this simple retaliation rule in real-life social dilemma games critically requires ". . .that the shadow of the future be sufficiently great" (Axelrod, 1984, p. 176 ). As we have seen, opportunistic tenants may hide their intentions, break rental agreements, and step out of the shadow of the future.
Situations in which TIT FOR TATers play with unconditional defectors in a small shadow of the future interaction, or informational asymmetries and misunderstandings among TIT FOR TAT communists may lead to ". . .an unending echo of alternating defections" (p. 176). Instead of provoking the perilous "echo effect," disappointed conditional cooperators should opt out of a tragic game, provided that the exit-option is available; see EdK-Group (2000) for a game-theoretic treatment of this common sense strategy. Alternatively, the remaining conditional cooperators may consider about a replacement of 'parasitic' club members (see footnote 6 above on exit procedures). However, the selection of appropriate new household members out of the "sea of anonymous others" (Axelrod, 1984 , p. 100) should be handled with care. "New brooms sweep clean." That is, in addition to easy-to-inspect qualities such as appearance and voice, home seekers exhibit experience qualities. The applicants' true characteristics, mental-health problems, and (un-)willingness to cooperate do not appear until after a while.
Catharsis: lessons learned
As a matter of course, not every apartment-sharing community inevitably deteriorates as sketched in the worst-case scenarios presented above, or as depicted in the amusing semi-fictional field studies by Birmingham (1994) , who allegedly "has lived with eighty-nine people and kept notes on all of them." One should never forget that a drama usually is not only a very emotional affair but has also a variety of subgenres such as the comedy of the commune in which conflicts among flat sharers have a happy ending. As we have seen, ". . . [u] nder suitable conditions, cooperation can indeed emerge in a world of egoists without central authority" (Axelrod, 1984, p. 20) . This paper has given some advice on how (not) to play communal games, and brought to mind some practical remedies with which present and future dwellers can govern their respective commune. Without doubt, smart communists may come up with more tricky mechanisms of self-governance. However, there is no best way of designing appropriate rules of the game, and regarding the choices within these rules ". . .no best rule exists independently of the strategy being used by the other player[s]" (Axelrod, 1984, p. 14) .
In reality, housemates and communes vary. Many real-world communes are nice places to live and are able to successfully operate as, for example, some of the recounts in Heath and Kenyon (2001) indicate. Consequently, it is an empirical question whether and how communists cope with day-to-day collective action problems, and whether and how they succeed in managing their respective commune. It may sound trivial but it is certainly true for different forms of home sharing that " [t] he presence of other household members, however, is both its greatest weakness and its greatest strength" (Heath and Kenyon, 2001, p. 97) . In a similar manner, Christie et al. (2002, p. 211) conclude with the unsurprising insight that ". . .housing circumstances can have a broad impact on the health and well being of individuals and households. Home can be the haven that allows one to face the stresses of life, or an additional burden creating extra stress and worry."
In any case, one can assume that individuals-more or less rapidly-learn from past communal games. In this vein, on the basis of their small-scale sample Christie et al. (2002, p. 219) note that "the evidence suggests that students generally got better quality accommodation in any subsequent move they made within the private rented sector as their knowledge about the city's housing market improved or as they learnt from a poor early experience." Complementary to gaining experiences via (sometimes painful) trial-and-error learning by living, one can learn from other persons mistakes, their positive and negative experiences. The Tragedy of the Commune does not intend to arouse empathy and structures the plot so ". . .that the one who is hearing the events unroll shudders with fear and pity at what happens" (Aristotle, 1987 [350 bc] , 1453b1). However, the previous episodes of conflict and cooperation presumably have a cathartic (i.e., emotionally cleansing) impact in the sense that they encourage the reader's critical reflections on the characters' situation and the (unintended) consequences of their interactions: "Human behaviour is shown as alterable; man himself as dependent on certain political and economic factors and at the same time as capable of altering them," as the German playwright Brecht (1965 Brecht ( [1935 , p. 86) put it. 15 Someone, who has 'witnessed' the presented worst-case scenarios, will hardly be shocked when his commune begins to be infested with rubbish, unpaid bills, mutual distrust, and the like. Being aware that the simple logic of collective action is always latent may be a helpful method for current and future apartment sharers to improve their real-world decision-making behavior. As a safeguard against unpleasant experiences and subsequent "counterfactual thinking" on past outcomes ("If only I had. . ."), which both can be very instructive for future decision-making behavior (Roese, 1997) , it seems a more clever method to engage directly in considering future possible outcomes. That does not mean to play as a unconditional defector, who expects that the other group members ". . .will always make the move you fear most" (Axelrod, 1984, p. 15) . But keeping the possibility at the back of one's mind that housemates, under specific conditions discussed above, could make the most feared move, can be a preventive mental simulation. In this vein, communists who assume that cohabitants normally pursue their self-interest and work with potential worst-case scenarios can hardly become disappointed by actual outcomes. Armed with a couple of standard tools and elementary survival tips from introductory textbooks in economics, a communist greenhorn is likely to find his way in his new surroundings. Somewhere along the way, alert and experienced flat sharers know every trick and are prepared for tragedies in other spheres of life as well.
